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Article text: 
 
Despite the precarious nature of politics in Northern Ireland, the emerging political 
differences on the question of the UK’s EU membership may not prove particularly 
divisive during the referendum, writes Christine Bell. However, she suggests that 
the institutions built around the peace process would be seriously undermined if the 
European frameworks upon which they are dependent are removed by UK exit from 
the EU. 
 
The EU referendum and the possibility of ‘Brexit’ raise distinct questions for 
Northern Ireland as a devolved region within the UK as part of the peace process. In 
the referendum debate, more attention needs to be given in the rest of the UK to 
Northern Ireland, the one part of the UK which has a land border with another EU 
country. 
 
Political Divisions and the EU Referendum Campaign 
 
The first key question as regards the EU referendum’s impact in Northern Ireland 
relates to the distinctiveness of its political settlement: how will the Brexit 
campaign affect political relationships – ever fragile – within Northern Ireland? 
 
The Northern Irish government is a power-sharing government: it involves a 
compulsory coalition in which the two biggest parties, the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, essentially share the first ministership. The First Minister 
is the DUP’s leader Arlene Foster and the Deputy First Minister is Sinn Féin’s Martin 
McGuiness, but this nomenclature is slightly misleading as in fact both have equal 
powers and can only act together as ‘the Office of the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister’ (OFMDFM). 
 
The DUP has come out in favour of leaving the EU while Sinn Féin has come out in 
favour of remaining. So the first key question is: How does a schizophrenic OFMDFM 
work in practice, and to what extent does navigating the referendum campaign risk 
further destabilising the power-sharing government?  One can see the impact of 
division on a single party government at the level of the UK and the lifting of 
collective responsibility, but that is a context of a party that had a single manifesto 
and ideology at the outset.  
 
As regards this question, however, there are some grounds for cautious optimism. 
Both Sinn Féin’s and the DUP’s positions were predictable and neither was in 
reaction to the other. Moreover, neither party is unequivocally confident in its 
position. 
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While, in the words of Foster, the DUP ‘has always been Eurosceptic in its outlook’, 
the party has a core rural constituency (to which Foster herself belongs) made up 
largely of farmers. This community is deeply worried about the uncertainty of 
Brexit. Farmers depend on a whole range of EU grants and schemes to which their 
entire financial outlook is currently tied. They are also physically and economically 
connected to the Republic of Ireland. 
 
It is unclear how either the UK government or devolved government would step in 
to replace current funding, how long it would take, and what would happen in the 
meantime. Moreover, while agriculture is devolved, that devolution is constrained 
and mediated (as in all devolved regions) by EU law. Shifting policy areas like this 
into a less constrained devolved setting could open up new issues to cross-
community contestation in unpredictable ways. 
 
For all of these reasons perhaps, the DUP position has been nuanced. To quote 
Foster again: 
 
At every stage in this European negotiation process we had hoped to see a 
fundamental change to our relationship with Europe. In our view, we see 
nothing in this deal that changes that outlook. Therefore we will on balance 
recommend a vote to leave the EU. 
 
That ‘on balance’ is important – for the DUP, it is extremely nuanced. Interestingly, 
since that statement even a nuanced ‘leave’ position has become somewhat isolated 
within Unionism: the once-dominant and fast-resurrecting Ulster Unionist Party 
has come out in favour of remaining. The influential and historically unionist Ulster 
Farmers’ Union has also said that there is no compelling case for Brexit, citing 
concern about subsidies, lack of alternative funds and the importance of the EU 
export market. 
 
A similarly nuanced position in favour of ‘remain’ has been taken by Sinn Féin, again 
under pressure of contradictory impulses. For their part, Sinn Féin may be great 
Europeanists now, but their record on Europe has not always been so enthusiastic. 
Notably, they opposed the Lisbon Treaty, campaigning for a ‘no in the first Irish 
referendum – a position that was successful. Admittedly, this campaign is not 
about whether to give more powers to Europe – rather it is about staying or leaving 
altogether. However, Sinn Féin’s previous opposition to Europe was driven both by 
an ‘Ireland’s interests’ argument and a leftist tinge rooted in the view of Europe as a 
negative capitalist club of elites. Neither of these impulses is irrelevant to this 
debate and neither has entirely gone away. 
 
Added to this, Sinn Féin is an abstentionist party in the UK Parliament on the 
grounds that, as Britain should not interfere in Ireland, so they will not interfere in 
British political decisions. It is therefore potentially problematic internally for them 
to campaign in a fundamentally ‘British’ decision. 
 
Their move to actively campaign against Brexit in this referendum has resulted 
mainly from their electoral ambitions in the Republic of Ireland. As these have 
grown over time, the party has firmly realised that being Eurosceptic in Ireland is 
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hugely unpopular – a little like opposing the NHS in the UK. Moreover, as discussed 
further below, the European context was vital to the Northern Ireland peace process, 
on which their success in the North also depends. These factors have pushed them 
to overcome their commitment to abstentionism and ‘non-interference’ in ‘British 
affairs’. 
 
Implications of EU Exit for Northern Ireland 
 
While both parties have jumped, predictably, in different directions, they do so with 
an amount of internal disquiet. As a result, they have nuanced their positions fairly 
carefully to take account of internal dissent in ways that may lead to a nuanced 
response to each other’s campaign tactics. There are reasons to hope, therefore, 
that the very fact of a Brexit campaign will not become overly divisive in an already 
divided society, despite the opposing positions of the two main parties of 
government. 
 
However, the second key question for Northern Ireland is how a ‘leave’ vote might 
impact on Northern Ireland and the wider British-Irish relationship that underpins 
the political settlement. Here, there is much less reason to be optimistic about the 
consequences of a ‘leave’ vote. As with Scotland, polls suggest that Northern Ireland 
will vote decisively to remain within the EU. There are four key serious concerns 
about the effect of a ‘leave’ vote on Northern Ireland. 
 
Removal of an Enabling Factor for Peace 
 
First, joint membership of the EU and commitment to European values, such as 
those of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), were a vital part of the 
context of the Northern Irish peace process. While the peace process was sold to 
Nationalists and Republicans as transformation of the Northern Irish State, the 
context of devolution and the close binding of the devolution framework to EU and 
ECHR law enabled Unionists to accept the project as one of ‘modernisation’ in line 
with the changes that were happening across the UK. 
 
Human rights and anti-discrimination law – transformative for Nationalists in 
ensuring that the new arrangements would not replicate the discriminatory 
devolution of the past – could be accepted by Unionists as a ‘normal’ part of the 
British (in Europe) context. Pulling the European platform from under the peace 
process fundamentally changes the political context in which people found 
themselves able to agree on contentious matters. Perhaps the political institutions 
can now weather this, but they are still far from any steady state of normal 
operation. 
 
Reinstatement of a Now Invisible Border 
 
Second, while the border was a major issue during the conflict, since the 1998 peace 
agreement this has been the ‘dog which has not barked’. The Republic of Ireland’s 
claim to the territory of Northern Ireland found in Articles 2 and 3 of its 
constitution was amended, and the UK implemented reciprocal commitments, such 
as incorporating the ECHR into UK law. The physical border was dismantled and 
freedom of movement, underpinned by a Common Travel Area (a sort of mini-
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Schengen between the UK and Ireland), has continued throughout. Cross-border 
movement, cooperation and trade have all been embraced by both Unionists and 
Nationalists and the removal of ‘the border’ from the arena of Unionist/Nationalist 
contention is a remarkable peace process achievement and was hard-won. 
 
This is the UK’s only land border with another country. If the UK were to leave the 
EU it would be difficult to see how the border could remain as open as it is today. 
Preventing immigration to the UK of EU-nationals who would have freedom of 
movement to Ireland, would only be possible by introducing strict border controls 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (or – even more contentious, 
but not without precedent – controls for entry to the rest of UK from Northern 
Ireland). 
 
The consequences of increased border controls and the re-erection of a dismantled 
physical border between the North and South would be disastrous politically and 
practically. For example, the second city in Northern Ireland – the majority 
nationalist Derry/Londonderry – essentially now has suburbs that sprawl over the 
border. People live and work on either side, crossing daily while working in 
essentially the same communal space carrying both euros and pounds and paying in 
either currency interchangeably on either side (the ATMs in Derry even dispense 
currency in euros if one wants). These cross-border hinterlands are replicated in 
dozens of rural farming communities along the border, which post-Brexit could find 
themselves with new physical barriers to circumvent, and under quite different 
trade regimes with other countries, depending what side of the road their cows 
graze on, where their house is, and where they got their passport from. 
 
Impact on Trade 
 
Third, tied up with the border is the question of trade between UK and Ireland. 
According to a recent UK government report, ‘Ireland is the UK’s fifth largest export 
market and imports more from the UK than any other country. The UK accounts for 
30 per cent of imports into Ireland. In 2014, exports of goods and services from the 
UK to Ireland totalled £27.86 billion.’  
 
If one counts trade moving both directions, cross-border trade is worth an 
estimated £65 billion annually. Whatever favourable relationships would be 
maintained, it is difficult to imagine Brexit and its consequences having absolutely 
no negative effect on this trade. A reduction of even a couple of per cent is a fairly 
devastating figure, and the upper-end figure of negative impact on trade is 20 per 
cent. 
 
EU Funding for Peace 
 
Finally, the EU has been central in funding the Northern Irish peace process. EU 
funding has arguably been a major key to the success of the implementation of the 
peace agreement. Since 1995, there have been three PEACE programmes, with a 
financial contribution of €1.3 billion. A fourth is in progress and will contribute 
£270 million. These have funded infrastructure, business, political reconciliation 
and civil society projects, all of which have striven to address the legacy of the 
conflict and create momentum for the peace process, with considerable success. 
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As stated on its website, the PEACE programme has been implemented as a cross-
border cooperation programme (in the context of European territorial cooperation) 
and has two main aims: 
• cohesion between communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland 
and the border counties of Ireland; and 
• economic and social stability. 
 
The programme addresses the specific problems caused by the conflict with the aim 
of creating a peaceful and stable society. To this end, it builds upon two main 
priorities (reconciling communities and contributing to peace) and the new 
programme will have four main objectives: 
• shared education; 
• helping children and young people; 
• creating shared spaces and services; 
• building positive relations at a local level. 
 
It is of course possible – as with so many things – that the money the UK pays into 
the EU could be spent directly on these matters. But how likely is this in the UK 
now?  
 
Moreover, EU funding has been about more than just money – EU money has been 
perceived as ‘neutral’ in ways UK government money was not. EU funds have also 
been smart in their modalities. They have involved very innovative delivery 
mechanisms that forced collaboration across peace walls, business and civil society, 
and political divides in what is perhaps the major unsung implementation ‘clever 
tool’ story of any peace process in the world. 
 
Remembering that Northern Ireland has had a peace process claiming to have ended 
the violence almost every decade from 1920 until the Agreement in 1998, one has 
to take seriously everything that was done differently this time round. It also helped 
build British-Irish relations. It seems a more than a pity to undo the very cross-
border cooperation that this programme has paid so much money for. 
 
Kicking Sleeping Dogs 
 
All of these issues concern not just the peace process, but British-Irish relationships 
more generally – which perhaps can be said to be currently at their all-time high of 
any point in history.  But the issues are fundamental to the peace process and for 
many the daily context of their lived lives. Brexit would be a massive kick to 
sleeping dogs that have been lying happily asleep for many years now. These dogs 
may of course yawn and lie down again, but that is quite a gamble and not usually 
what kicking sleeping dogs achieves. 
 
And the kick may perhaps happen without the consent of the people of the island of 
Ireland, North and South, whose consent to any change in their political settlement 
was so carefully negotiated and voted on across the island, with unquantifiable 
benefits to the whole of the UK. 
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No one in Northern Ireland kids themselves: none of these issues will drive or be 
decisive in the debate across the UK. In fact, they may be lucky to get a mention in 
the mainstream national media. But perhaps the fact that the UK has a sensitive 
land border with another European country, and that the common context of EU 
membership underpins the end to a violent conflict, should be taken a little more 
seriously beyond Northern Ireland – or even at least noticed. 
 
This article was informed in part by a joint meeting on EU and British-Irish relations 
held by the Royal Irish Academy and British Academy on 1 March 2016. Views and 
opinions remain the author’s own. 
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